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History, Memory, Tradition

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Evaluating testimony as it invariably shifts is not simple. La Capra (1998) draws a line between the expectable influence of time and context upon how we hear testimony versus the contrived or deliberate manipulation of the context by the witness or historian. Thus, while Lanzmann's *Shoah* is widely viewed as a documentary, La Capra reveals that it contains testimony that is intricately staged. For example, the filmmaker's interview with the survivor Abraham Bomba – a barber who had shorn the hair of Jews along their path to the gas chambers – takes place in an empty barber shop rented to mimic reality, and the “customers” are hired actors. Notably, this staging is not made explicit in the film. Such an omission exists alongside Lanzmann's choice to avoid historical footage from either the ghettos or the death camps, iconic imagery that tends to reinforce contrived Holocaust tropes. Actual survivor testimony is Lanzmann's most evocative and authentic alternative, yet manipulations of such testimony have the opposite effect upon the viewer, so that Lanzmann is managing our responses while feigning the opposite. In other contexts Lanzmann has apparently claimed that *Shoah* is not a historical documentary but a work of art (La Capra, 1998, p. 96). This is not, however, the impression the film consistently makes.

La Capra also critiques Lanzmann's interviewing style. He notes a scene in which the filmmaker insists that the survivor Bomba continue to speak about a particularly harrowing moment. Such a provocative method, La Capra fears, may force the actual victim to relive traumatizing events, while concealing Lanzmann's “own intrusiveness in asking questions that prod the victim to the point of breakdown” (p.123). That Lanzmann orchestrates the direction and tenor of the interview is not merely a matter of his putting his subject through unnecessary pain. For the purposes of any historical project, it once again calls into question the usefulness of testimony when a witness interferes with the narrative.

Still, the line between deliberate and unbidden influence is thin, for testimony can neither be given nor heard objectively. As many a post-modern psychoanalyst has noted, since Heisenberg (1952) we have known that all observers unwittingly alter that which is under study, subtly or minutely changing the outcome. Moreover, each observation alters with the perspective from which a thing or event is viewed. In this sense there is no fact nor historical truth in the singular, overarching sense. The goal must be an expanded, multifaceted, rather than a definitive, understanding.

Martin Bergmann

My meeting with Professor Martin Bergmann (2010), celebrated scholar, clinician, and historian provides a case in point. Bergmann, let us recall, helped draft the report (Bergmann & Jucovy, 1982) of the pioneering study group of analysts and their families who were Holocaust survivors. In the

report, the analysts were said to exhibit two sorts of “resistances” in their work, either placing a “persistent emphasis” on the Holocaust at the expense of other data, or else “ignoring” its role as a causative agent in the pathology of the patient. To this Bergmann and Jucovy added the thought that it is “not irrelevant to point out that the group of investigators who participated in [the] study consists of survivors, refugees who—escaping the Holocaust—came to the United States,” along with a few American-born Jews. “Every member of the group was therefore confronted with the necessity of reliving some portion of an unmastered past” (pp. 248–249). Some analysts seemingly could not let go of it, while others apparently put it perhaps too far from their minds. A notable example of the latter process, according to Kestenberg (1982, p. 41n), one of the founders of the Holocaust Study Group, can be observed in Heinz Kohut's published case of “Mr. A” (also mentioned briefly in Chapter 1 of this volume), whose symptoms were closely related to surviving the Shoah and yet were understood by his analyst only in terms of pre-Oedipal pathology.

When I interviewed Bergmann, this pioneer in the psychoanalytic study of the Holocaust was hesitant to agree that the Nazi scourge had any direct impact on his own professional development. It was not, he explained, merely that he himself was neither exile nor survivor in the strict sense. He was born in Prague in 1913, and in the 1920s emigrated with his parents and siblings to Palestine when his father accepted a position as Professor of Philosophy at The Hebrew University. While his aunts, uncles, and cousins were killed by Nazis, Bergmann felt that these losses were not painfully or traumatically significant to him because his major attachments were to his parents and siblings. Rather, he views his choices through the lens of Freudian theory. He shared that his scholarly pursuit of Freud could be understood as symbolic of an Oedipal rivalry with his father, who was himself a renowned scholar and an intimate of Kafka. During his analysis, Bergmann maintained, the Viennese analyst Fenichel, who had previously analyzed Bergmann's unmarried analyst Edith Jacobson, “stood in” for the father during Bergmann's treatment. Thus, as analysand, Bergmann embarked upon a mission to learn more about Freud than Fenichel, who had written the definitive text on metapsychology.

In response, I initially wanted to convince Bergmann that émigré analysts were perhaps too close to the glare of the catastrophe of the century, and thus shielded their eyes from the trauma. Nor was I able to consider that we might both be correct, neither one of us possessing the corner on “truth.” Interestingly, Bergmann's wife, the analyst Maria Bergmann, apparently had a different view, one closer to my preconceptions. During an interview with the German analyst Wirth (2002) she stated that “after the war, the first generation of the psychoanalysts could not deal with the Holocaust at all. The analysts were not even interested when their patients wanted to share their stories about it” (p. 109).³ When I asked Bergmann

about the Wirth interview, he claimed that ultimately he himself had felt motivated to recognize the Holocaust because the survivors he had been treating were not helped by the traditional focus upon their pre-war, intrapsychic conflict. He realized that their actual life experiences, their Holocaust traumas, had to be addressed as they influenced the quality of their inner lives, or the treatment would fail.

Interestingly, there seemed to be a shift in the nature of our conversation when Bergmann asked me a less formal, more affect-laden question, and we were no longer discussing the history of psychoanalytic theory and technique. He felt curious about my interest in the Holocaust, he said, particularly because I was from a younger generation, and born in the US. With undisguised pleasure and gratitude he remarked, "I don't know a soul in your generation who cares like this." I shared my family's story, particularly my Polish-French grandmother's odyssey, noting the cultures she lost and the siblings she left behind who were killed. We spoke of the difficulty of mourning. Bergmann generously offered some reading material that he felt might help me. I then dared to ask, "If my inner life is at work in my interest, what about yours?" Bergmann's expression immediately changed, as if a light had turned on. "Ah!" he said, "You want to know what is unconscious for me in this!" At this point our interview time was up, yet Bergmann, after stating that he was "taken in" but "required time to consider my question," graciously offered to meet me again, in order to continue our inquiry.

What had happened between us? Perhaps Bergmann and I had a "right brain to right brain" communication, as the neuropsychologists would characterize it. Perhaps we were then better able to link our narratives and contain the affect that was by its nature dysregulating. Our subsequent meetings were indeed characterized less by logical dueling, and yielded a much more complex experience, particularly regarding the ways in which those we loved, who had in turn lost their loved ones, had an impact on our professional interests and choices. Sitting in his office full with some of the European *Yiddishkeit* that the Nazis otherwise destroyed—photos of shtetl Jews and other pieces of art—Bergmann went on to recall that his father referred to his murdered relatives and friends as "the *kidoshim*," Hebrew for "the holy ones."

A Dialectic of Memories

Such a dialogue as evolved between myself and Bergmann will produce what Laub calls "a dialectic" of memories (p. 62), focused not only on facts and data, but on the textured nature of experience. As Suleiman (2006) puts it, it is the personal or subjective memory, as opposed to public memory. In this general context Laub speaks of a woman who gave testimony about a revolt she witnessed at Auschwitz, when the crematoria were sabotaged. He describes the great change in her demeanor. At first

Her presence was barely noteworthy in spite of the overwhelming magnitude of the catastrophe she was addressing. She tread lightly, leaving hardly a trace ...

But then she abruptly changed:

She was relating her memories as an eyewitness of the Auschwitz uprising: a sudden intensity, passion and color were infused into the narrative. She was fully there. "All of a sudden," she explained, "we saw four chimneys going up in flames, exploding. The flames shot into the sky, people were running. It was unbelievable."

(Laub, 1993, p. 59)

Laub is impressed by the transformation of this woman's "monotonous and lamenting tone" into "aliveness" and an "explosion of vitality" as she recalls the revolt, as if "a comet of intensity" had briefly passed through the scene as she testified. In keeping with Levenson's notion of the connection between words and acts, Laub links the change in her behavior to the shifting content in the story as she related the movement from helpless passivity to armed resistance. Yet, after watching the same videotaped testimony, a historian—who was not an analyst—claimed that the speaker was not a reliable witness. Why? Because the number of crematoria chimneys the woman remembered was incorrect. In response, Laub, who had witnessed the woman's testimony himself, defends her narrative, noting that the number of chimneys is irrelevant to the usefulness of her narrative. He insists that she was testifying about

something else, more radical, more crucial: the reality of an unimaginable occurrence. One chimney blown up in Auschwitz was as incredible as four. The number mattered less than the fact of the occurrence. The event itself was almost inconceivable ... She testified to the breakage of a framework. That was historical truth.

(p. 60)

Another traditional historian, however, was still not deterred, for not only was the survivor incorrect about the chimneys, but also about the significance of the revolt, which ended in failure. Worse, the *sonderkommando*⁴ who blew up the crematoria were betrayed by the Polish underground, who had promised to come to their aid, but ultimately did not. The Jewish men who set the explosions, and some of the women prisoners who helped them procure the explosives, were left to fight and die alone. They were not only shot, but tortured beforehand so that they might reveal their suppliers.

Did the woman who testified remember the events incorrectly, misunderstanding the inner arc of this piece of history? Perhaps, but only in the

context of public memory. Her private memory tells us something that is also historically accurate, but this time about the monotony and helplessness at Auschwitz juxtaposed against an incredible, if transient act of free will. Indeed, Laub adds that had he known the full details of the underground's betrayal of the Jewish fighters, it might have interfered with his capacity to witness, to hear the woman's story without subverting it to his own agenda. Whatever nuanced implications are contained in public, intellectual memory can sometimes be a bar to private memory, but honoring both can allow our understanding of the other to deepen, and expands our awareness.

It is, however, difficult to appreciate another point of view while in the throes of one's own subjectivity. Yet this obviously remains a central, if elusive psychoanalytic goal—for both patient and analyst. The psychoanalyst and author Anton Kris, son of the Viennese ego psychologist Ernst Kris, displayed this kind of openness to ideas less familiar to him, utilizing his rich mix of intellectual and clinical acumen, together with personal reminiscences of a childhood and an early adulthood spent at the center of post-World War II psychoanalysis in America. Sitting with him I was immediately struck by his capacity to listen, to witness.

Anton Kris

"I was an embryo on Freud's couch," Kris said at one point, "because my mother, Marianne Kris, was in analysis with Freud when she was pregnant with me." This seemed a good moment for me to quip, "Can I touch your hand?" We both laughed, and I added, "Do you think Freud and his theories were reified by refugee analysts after the war?" To this Kris responded, "Yes. My training in Boston [at the Boston Institute for Psychoanalysis] was very rigid. I was much better before it, and even better long after it." He continued, however,

I am not sure this reification and rigidity can be attributed to Hitler or emigration. Everyone who knew him [Freud], noticed that the force of the man was colossal ... and he knew how to rally people, how to use them to forward his ideas.

Later, he added, speaking of the émigrés in relation to Freud,

It may be that after they were expelled, the rallying around him, around psychoanalysis, gave them a place, a position in an alien world. But why was it such an orthodox world? I don't know. Maybe it's true that the orthodoxy made it too important, and that was the point.

Continuing our conversation, I asked Kris to describe what he knew of those times, adding that after Hitler took power, life in Vienna was immediately problematic for those identified as Jewish by the Nazis. Kris smiled.

"My father resigned from his job the day of the *Anschluss*. We went to England where things were much better." He noted that Anna Freud, who enjoyed a close professional and personal relationship with his father, had also emigrated there. "[My father] regretted leaving England," Kris ended.

When I asked why he left, Kris explained, "He had two children—I have a sister—who could be killed in the bombings. But I don't think he ever recovered from leaving England." I persisted. "Do you think that his loss affected the nature of his work?"

Kris answered, "My father died when I was 22 and I was not yet an analyst. I couldn't know about these things then ... I am sorry I am not able to give you the answers you want."

But Kris was wrong about this. His openness and attention to detail were quite valuable to my understanding, especially when he went on to hypothesize:

I do know that the orthodoxy was a stifling thing, and not necessarily was it always the case. For instance, I was later told that the analyst's silence was not part of the Viennese tradition. The notion of "pure" abstinence in this way was partly English and American. The person who really broke into this was Kohut; he was the first to change things.

I once again wondered out loud whether such purism was a reaction to loss and change, some sort of reification of the past that invariably runs the risk of becoming distorted. I added that perhaps it was Kohut's experience of being humiliated and devalued by the Nazis, in which some essential sense of himself was threatened, that contributed to his focus on the problems of narcissism. Kris found this notion intriguing, but felt he could offer no evidence (see Thomas Kohut, Chapter 1 of this volume, for further commentary on this hypothesis). Yet he did volunteer an important idea:

Freud's view of human nature and of therapeutic action was utterly radical, but he used the established positivist scientific approach to describe and validate psychoanalysis. I suppose he was ambivalent about how outside the margins he was. Rather than say that transference can't be measured along the usual lines, he tried to make psychoanalytic ideas and technique systematic. This was Freud's ambivalence about the nature of what he discovered, and his ambition. He wanted to be a universally accepted scientist, like Darwin, but he really needed to think of psychoanalysis as a thing apart. He needed to develop a new methodology to study it.

"But why," I continued, "didn't the émigrés who carried on the tradition see this flaw? Why did they persist in the systemization?" "They were responding to the times," Kris suggested,

Or maybe your idea—that they were responding to what they had suffered and lost is true, but I have yet to see the evidence that this rigid and even xenophobic attitude came from what happened to them in Europe. I see your point but I don't see the proof.

He thought a minute, and then suggested some sources that might reveal some of the personal views of the analysts of the time, for which I expressed genuine gratitude. "Some is in German. If you can't find a translator, I will try to help," he added. "I think your research and your thesis are very important."

Only in retrospect, upon reviewing our interview, does it occur to me that perhaps an "ambivalence" towards embracing radical ideas was being played out between Dr. Kris and myself. To begin with, our conversation involved challenging the version of psychoanalysis as a "science" free from outside influence. Moreover, we were questioning the conventional version of the European émigrés, that they were simply lucky to escape and save psychoanalysis, successful in America and England in ways they never imagined before the war. I hoped that I might find some document, some biographical statement in which one or another analyst from the period would reveal the link between his or her experience of the Nazi scourge and its impact on the course of a new psychoanalysis, an impact as profound as it has been unspoken. My quest for "proof positive" makes its own example of Levenson's "harmonic variations" between words and acts, for, as I have implied, I enacted the same entrenchment regarding methodology that Kris had spoken of regarding Freud and the early psychoanalysts—an attachment to a positivist method. This despite having heartily agreed with Kris's critique; I simply assumed that my enthusiasm for his insights was protected by the more self-reflexive distance of time and place! It seems in retrospect that Kris, too, hoped I might find more tangible evidence, perhaps his part in the enactment of which I speak.

In fact, however, since most documents reflect the *zeitgeist* of the time, or remain silent on matters that are too provocative and by necessity unformulated, the written material that Kris suggested—autobiographical accounts written by analysts—provided me with very little evidentiary assistance. Yet, thanks to Kris's testimony, I became privy to a fuller picture than I had known before. I began to see that Freud the man had already cast a long shadow upon psychoanalysis across two continents, even as the greater European catastrophe may have further reified his presence. That his metapsychology became rigidified over time is a conclusion shared by each analyst I interviewed, but the reasons for this reification are not universally agreed upon, nor can we conclude that they are determined by the Holocaust alone.

Finally, Kris's private memories counter some of the conclusions drawn by others who do not possess his first hand view of history, including

myself. For example, he flatly disagreed with Russell Jacoby's (1984) hypothesis that the politically active Fenichel was in effect driven to his death between his emigration—expulsion really—from Europe and the difficulty of adapting to the highly medicalized version of psychoanalysis he found in America. Kris told me, "I don't agree with the Jacoby hypothesis on Fenichel. Fenichel died of a Berry brain aneurysm, which is a congenital condition . . . In fact we saw him just before he died and he was quite well." Later, after reading a preliminary draft of this manuscript, Kris reminded me that he was but 11 years old the last time he saw Fenichel, and perhaps less aware than an adult, although during our interview he did remember Fenichel looking well. Jacoby, conversely, paints Fenichel as a figure palpably changed by his ordeal in the US. Kris, an M.D. as well as an analyst, holds to the view that a rupture of a Berry aneurysm is congenitally determined, rather than stress induced.

What am I to do with these conflicting pictures? I shall assume they both have merit, and represent truths seen through the eyes of various individuals at various moments. They may not be unconditionally valid, but likely capture the complexity of Fenichel's time in America and the subjectivity of the observer during an era both hopeful and tragic.

On the Other Side of the World: Dori Laub and Otto Kernberg

If there are those who remain silent or at least uncertain regarding the impact of the Holocaust in psychoanalysis, there are other analysts I interviewed who are less reticent regarding its influence. Dori Laub (personal interview, 2010) expressed the sentiment of many when he claimed to have been "fortunate not to be connected to the mainstream." Otto Kernberg (personal interview, 2010) similarly counted himself lucky that he was free to think about ideas outside of the narrow range of what was known as "classical psychoanalysis."

As a young boy we escaped from Austria to Chile. I was lucky to be trained at a small institute at the end of the world. And first I started out in medical school in Chile with teachers like Ignacio Matte Blanco—he was very open. I had a lot of good, creative models before and during medical school, and then I read Freud, I liked Adler, too, and Jung was interesting and complex. Nobody told me what was acceptable or unacceptable. However when I came to the US I was really impressed by how regimented post-war psychoanalysis was. I was first in Topeka, Kansas, at the Meninger Foundation, and then in New York.

Over time Kernberg's work brought together Freud's energetic and structural models, developmental ego psychology, and the British object relations

theories of Klein and Fairbairn. In other words, Kernberg broke through fixed boundaries of discrete theories of psychic structure and pathogenesis in post-war America. In this way he revolutionized the understanding and treatment of Borderline patients and what he refers to as "severe character disorders." Kernberg put it this way:

In the late 1960s and 1970s, I began to notice the compatibilities between Ego Psychology and the British School. So I started writing, and pointing to them. And I immediately came under attack. Melanie Klein was not acceptable, for instance.

He added that the Viennese who came to America "idealized what they had lost" in Europe, and experienced new ideas as a threat to that idealization. He continued:

The work of Edith Jacobson and Margaret Mahler were also very close to the ideas I developed, and Fairbairn, too. But the point is that I was combining all these separate ideas in a new way and at first this was very, very difficult; it was not so acceptable then.

Dori Laub also felt fortunate to have had a Swedish analyst while in training at the Austin Riggs center in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, between 1967 and 1969. His analyst had knowledge of liberated survivors from camps, who gave impossibly prettified depositions as they recovered in Sweden. Laub was told that these survivors "claimed to have been given breakfast in bed at the camp." He also described Polish women who said "the coffee in Theresienstadt was better than what they were getting in Sweden." The similarity to what Laub had been remembering from childhood was palpable. Laub went on:

It was then that he stopped me ... He interrupted my descriptions of my idyllic childhood on the banks of the river Bug [in the Ukraine]. Because I was not able to know about it ... There were sounds of the Nazi death squads killing Jews on the other side of the river; instead I said I was playing in the green fields with another child and debating whether or not you could eat grass ... Soon we figured out this had something to do with hunger ... because I was starving.

But Laub says that his analyst was the exception. "Most clinicians didn't explore these things. It was all about infantile neurosis." When he began to write about trauma, and co-founded what are now the Fortunoff Archives of Holocaust Testimony at Yale University, Laub told me, "I was non-existent to mainstream psychoanalysts ... I was never invited to speak at the American meetings, never to Western New England Institute."

As it happens, one of Laub's widely revered, beloved supervisors at that particular Institute was himself a Jew and a leftist who fled the Nazis on fear of death.

He was a wonderful supervisor, but even he did not see the trauma in my patient's life. The patient's father was lost in the Pacific during the war and my supervisor focused on her jealousy ... No one asked about the father, or the intergenerational transmission of trauma ... The analysis failed ... The patient would scream at me and a colleague next door heard and asked me, "What are you doing to her?"

Overall, Laub explained, post-World War II analysis was not open to a mixed model of pathogenesis because, he feels, "orthodoxy became an armor, the theory became their armor, to leave no opening for some memory, some recognition of what had happened to creep in."

Other clinicians I interviewed who were trained in the interpersonal tradition, and thus similarly outside the classical mainstream, tend to speak rather directly of the ways in which the Holocaust and the Nazi scourge influenced their work. The analyst and author Paul Lippmann (personal interview, 2010), a first-generation American whose Jewish family languished and died in the ghettos of occupied Poland, speaks openly of the impact of the Shoah on himself and on his professional life, particularly in his focus on dreams (2002) and personal history. He, and others whose testimony may be read in Chapter 7 of this volume, simply assume that their exposure to Nazism in some way impacted their professional sensibilities.

Yet, paradoxically, we may find ourselves at the far side of the post-modern swing of the pendulum, in the midst of an overemphasis on the surround, and at a loss for enduring concepts or theories of mind that transcend history. The testimony of Bergmann and Kris act as correctives to this inclination, reminders that thinkers and their theories may also transcend the moment and cast light and shadows to be considered alongside context. Again, a multiplicity of factors affected psychoanalysis during and after National Socialism, from both within and without its ranks.

If a straight line from the Nazi scourge to post-Holocaust psychoanalytic theory and technique thus cannot be drawn, consider that even those engaged in the "hard" sciences do not expect to follow crystalline paths towards singular results. Levenson (1972) quotes Bertrand Russell, who says, "I have wished to know how the stars shine, I have tried to apprehend the Pythagorean power by which numbers hold sway above the flux. A little of this, but not much I have achieved" (p. 217). Instead, exploring the governance of the universe, how people grow, or, more specifically, the intersection between personal trauma and psychoanalytic discourse requires following what Levenson calls "the melody of change" (p. 217).

Notes

- 1 Numerous émigré analysts I have interviewed commented upon how many more professional opportunities they enjoyed in the U.S. as opposed to the future they imagined in Europe. Yet many also revealed having missed their birthplace to one degree or another.
- 2 Interestingly, psychoanalyst Marvin Nierenberg (personal interview, 2011) recalls Niederland as the supervising analyst of Nierenberg's training case. The patient was a child of a Holocaust survivor, and Niederland reportedly stayed close to the session material, helping his student to maintain an analytic, that is, an open minded and generative attitude and process, with little or no emphasis on presumptive theory. Perhaps this reminiscence reminds us that published work does not always match the privacy of the consulting room. Put differently, the affective responsiveness generated within an interactive matrix—both supervisory and therapeutic—does not always fit the theory, or a prescribed, refined technique, for many of the reasons discussed in this volume.
- 3 Anna Ornstein similarly relayed that she had written a narrative of her experiences in Auschwitz for her first analyst to read. He did not take it from her, but she persisted and left it with his secretary, who again tried to return it to Ornstein (personal interview, 2010).
- 4 *Sonderkommando*, translated from the German, literally means "special commando," but is actually a euphemism for the brigade of Jews who led their kinsmen and women into the gas chambers, and then burned their dead bodies in the crematoria. After a few weeks or months, they, too, were killed, replaced by a new "commando" forced into the same job, in an ongoing cycle. That these severely traumatized men maintained enough personal agency to organize a revolt is astonishing indeed.

Not Gentle Creatures

The element of truth behind all this, which people are so ready to disavow, is that men are not gentle creatures...

(Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 1930, p.111)

When Hitler marched into Vienna in 1938, the geographical and interpersonal map of psychoanalysis was changed forever. The Freud family fled after the Gestapo repeatedly searched their home, impounded their possessions, looted the Verlag (the psychoanalytic press in Vienna), retained Anna at headquarters for hours, and extorted large sums of money in exchange for safe passage (Friedlander, 2007). Along with scores of Central European colleagues, they found both refuge and Melanie Klein's dominant voice in London, a situation not altogether pleasing to them. Sigmund Freud died less than a year later, and Anna, already a prominent child analyst, took up his standard as heir apparent.

The year 1940 marked the beginning of the London "Blitz"—the Nazis' lightning war of relentless aerial bombing—but the émigrés, classified as "enemy aliens," were not permitted to escape to the countryside nor to join the army, as so many of their English colleagues had done. A sudden majority at Institute meetings, they became bent upon identifying the "true" psychoanalysis to be taught and practiced. Friction only intensified when Klein and her followers returned in 1941 as attacks on the city eased. While Anna Freud distanced herself from those who recommended complete censorship of Klein (Makari, 2008), she did propose meetings—culminating in what are now known as the "controversial discussions"—to reveal who was legitimately within the bounds of psychoanalysis and who should be evicted from the psychoanalytic "house" (quoted in Makari, 2008, p. 471).

In an effort to avoid what psychoanalyst Riccardo Steiner (2000b, p. 6) describes as a "mechanistic juxtaposition of internal and external historiographies," I wish to highlight not only the impact of personal and group dynamics on the storm that ensued, but also the role of context, of what